The basic point of this contribution is to emphasise that in understanding the link between neuroscience and developing educational programmes, we have to do more than pay lipservice to the fact that they operate at very distinct levels of description and abstraction. We should clearly acknowledge that there are at least three levels of relevance here -the biological, the cognitive and the behavioural. Current neuroscience straddles the biological and the cognitive and current educational practice and research straddles the behavioural and the cognitive. It is simply premature and disingenuous to claim that anything currently in the literature straddles all three levels. Or at least in such a way as to convey the impression that biological facts and theories currently have implications for educational practice that offer anything distinctive from that offered by cognitive theories. A simple example might make this point. Our concept of autism, and indeed what kinds of educational regimes might be effective in responding to it, has been profoundly influenced by developments in cognitive neuroscience in the past 20 years. If we allow that the acknowledgement of a biological basis to autism stems from work in neuroscience (interpreted broadly, and certainly including genetics) then this has been a major contribution in understanding the cause of autism. However, we would submit that exactly what this biological basis is and indeed what specific genes may or may not be involved, or what neurochemical pathways are compromised (or whatever), while of the greatest scientific interest, is of little or no importance to educational planning over and above the basic fact that there is a biological cause of autism. On the other hand, what has been important for possible intervention is the development of theories for understanding the cognitive basis of autism -for example that it might be caused by a deficit in ''theory of mind''. This is because cognitive theories only require a translation to an adjacent level of explanation (the behavioural) before meaningful intervention principles can be developed. This level of translation is hard enough but infinitely more attainable than translations over two levels of explanation especially when there is not an intervening cognitive link (what cognitive theory of autism hangs on whether biochemical pathway X or biochemical pathway Y is the cause of autism?). The ''levels'' approach shows every sign of leading to successful theory development in understanding developmental disorders and linking them to their biological substrates (Morton, 2004). We believe that this is a surer footing than any available set of neuroscientific facts can provide for those interested in developing educational programmes.
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None of this is to say that there can be no sound implication of neuroscientific facts and theories for educational intervention, just that this is unlikely to occur without at the very least the development of an intervening cognitive theory. We can think of no better contemporary example than the controversy surrounding DORE Achievement Centres. The DORE programme, now with more than 50 centres worldwide, advertises itself as a unique medication-free approach to help children who have been ''labelled'' as suffering from a developmental disorder such as dyslexia, ADHD, and dyspraxia. The essence of the programme is a series of exercises designed to stimulate the cerebellum. The rationale is based on the view that there are good neuroscientific reasons to believe that cerebellar functioning may be implicated in many developmental disorders. Be that as it may, there is but one study (Reynolds et al., 2003) that claims the program is effective for aiding children with a developmental disorder (in this case dyslexia). However, the methodology of this study has been severely criticized in a number of ways (Snowling 
